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The lawmaking process established by the Constitution's first article
includes a regard for democracy, rationality, and decisiveness. How this
is so, and how these matters are suspended in a fine balance within Arti-
cle I, is revealed by Arrow's theorem. This theorem, for which Kenneth
A. Arrow received the Nobel Prize in 1972, is a proof about the possibili-
ties and limitations of modes of collective choice.1
A point of entry into what Arrow's theorem says about Article I is
an examination of a certain first impression. This impression is that as
the theorem proves the impossibility of rational (that is, consistent and
coherent) social choices by voting systems turning on majority rule, it
shows an inability on the part of democratic processes to achieve consis-
tent and coherent social policy. But such rational policy, the theorem
also showed, might be achieved by means of a dictator.2
Consequently, the theorem is seen as supporting legislative arrange-
ments alternative to those established by Article I. In particular, the the-
orem is seen as supporting the transfer of legislative power out of the
democratic politics of Article I, where rationality is thought to be impos-
sible, to places where it is possible. The modern administrative agency,
operating according to a condition of dictatorship, is thought to be such
a place. 3 In this way, Arrow's theorem is taken as proving the intui-
tion-about achieving consistent and coherent social policy through
technocratic governance-that has long been offered as a justification for
the administrative state.4
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1. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
2. Id. at 59.
3. See D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 189 (1979); Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Adininistra-
tors Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 81, 98-99 (1985).
4. See M. WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 324-423 (1964).
The classic New Deal exposition of the faith in technocratic rationality is found in J. LANDIS, TIlE
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In this context, transferring legislative power to administrative agen-
cies has straightforwardly been seen as a trade-off of democratic values
for the rationality and decisiveness of agencies. Viewed in these terms,
the debate centers on whether this diminution of democratic values is
worth it, whether "fundamental policy decisions in our society" should
be decided "by an appointed official" or by Congress, the "body immedi-
ately responsible to the people." '5
A contribution of Arrow's theorem is to widen this debate. As it
sheds strong new light on the various parts of Article I-on its decision
costs and checks and its so deliberately diffused lawmaking process-it
shows how rationality is induced by these parts. The way in which Arti-
cle I makes that rationality possible also ordains a certain result, a cer-
tain indecisiveness in our national legislative process. Today this
indecisiveness is sometimes disparaged as "democratic paralysis." To the
framers, however, it was a "circumspection in lawmaking" desirable
enough to be considered a purpose of Article I. This circumspection re-
flects the belief that government is neither an exclusive nor error-free
way of making social choices. Consequently, a certain deliberation and
care in the choices government does make is essential.
This article is about three things. The first is how rationality and a
"circumspection in lawmaking" are, along with democratic values, pur-
poses of Article I, and how these purposes are held in balance within
Article I. The second is whether delegations of legislative power to agen-
cies serve these purposes of rationality and circumspection. As constitu-
tional law goes, these things are serious. Perhaps our Constitution is
marvelous in its flexibility. Even so, it can be stretched so as to become
dysfunctional, so that instead of facilitating American government, it im-
pedes it. It seems to me that in the case of expedient and careless alloca-
tions of legislative power to agencies we have reached that stretching
point.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). The creation of the Federal Trade Commission is an example of
congressional faith in that rationality. Congress gave the FTC sweeping power over commercial
practices on a profession of faith that trained experts would develop consistent economic policy, a
body of "precedents and traditions, and a continuous policy." G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 19 (1924).
5. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
For a classic exposition of consensual government, see J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT (P. Laslett ed. 1960). Locke wrote that:
The People alone can appoint the Form of the Commonwealth, which is by Constituting
the Legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the People have
said, We shall submit to rules, and be govern'd by Laws made by such Men, and in such
Forms, no Body else can say other Men shall make Laws for them; nor can the People be




The third thing that this article is about is the "delegation doctrine."
If one concludes, as I do, that basic choices of social policy should be
made in Congress and not in the agencies, then the natural inquiry, at
least for lawyers, is whether this limitation on agency power is a viable
legal limitation. That is, is the delegation doctrine as it distinguishes be-
tween appropriate and inappropriate delegations of legislative power dis-
criminating enough to be enforced by the courts?
I. ARTICLE I AND ARROW'S THEOREM
As an individual makes choices, he can be expected to do so consist-
ently and coherently. If an individual prefers disarmament to cold war
and cold war to hot war, then we can assume that he will prefer disarma-
ment to hot war. We cannot, however, make the same assumption when
people make choices collectively. Suppose that a community chooses
among various options. Accepting the grundnorm of democracy, that
the community's choices should be based on the preferences of its mem-
bers, then the intuitively appealing means of making those choices is by
majority vote. There is much to be said for this means of collective
choice: it is decisive, it is simple, and it establishes an equality among
voters.
Counter to most people's intuition, this mode of collective choice
will not, however, produce consistent and coherent choices as in the case
of an individual. Suppose that a community consists of three individuals
and that its choices are among options A, B, and C. Suppose that the
first individual prefers A to B, B to C, and A to C; that the second prefers
B to C, C to A, and B to A; and that the third prefers C to A, A to B, and
C to B. Counting the votes, the community prefers A to B and B to C.
This would seem to imply that the community prefers A to C. But this is
not so; in fact a majority prefers C to A. As the community's choices
lack consistency and coherency, these choices are also "path depen-
dent"-that is, a particular choice can be determined by controlling the
voting agenda.6
The fact of cyclical choices as arrived at above is referred to as Con-
dorcet's paradox, after the Marquis de Condorcet, the French mathema-
tician and philosopher who described this fact two hundred years ago.7
Today, Kenneth Arrow proved that Condorcet's paradox applied univer-
sally to methods of collective choice. He did so axiomatically, that is, he
identified certain conditions as being essential to any fair and rational
6. See W. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 170-82 (1982).
7. See D. BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 159-80 (1963) (discussing
Condorcet's theory of elections).
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system of collective choice.8 Then he showed that no system can meet
them all.
The conditions Arrow identified may be described as four conditions
of fairness and a condition of rationality. These conditions, and the
propensities associated with them, are reasonable and, on the face of it,
mild: they generally preclude obviously perverse operations of a system
of collective choice.9 For instance, under these conditions a social choice
is path independent; it cannot be influenced by means of agenda
control.10
In the context of this article, a general discussion of the conditions
of Arrow's theorem is unnecessary. The main point is that a system of
collective choice-cannot simultaneously satisfy them all. As a point of
interest, however, the conditions may briefly be described as follows.
The first four conditions, as I said, are concerned with the fairness of a
system of collective choice. The first of these is "unrestricted scope,"
which requires that a system of collective choice be able to process any
coherent set of individual preferences as to any number of options. The
iecond is one of "unanimity," which requires that when everyone prefers
A to B, a system must rank A above B. The third is "independence of
irrelevant alternatives." Under this condition, a social choice among op-
tions of a given set can depend only on preferences as to those options.
The fourth condition, one that is a subject of this article, is that of
nondictatorship-that no single individual can make his preference the
social choice irrespective of the preferences of the other members of the
community.11
The theorem's fifth condition, that of rationality, is of considerable
interest to us. As identified by Arrow, this is a condition of transitivity.12
If A is preferred to B, and B to C, then these choices imply that A is
preferred to C. The converse is intransitivity, a decisional process that
cycles, producing the unstable result of A being preferred to B, B to C,
and then, irrationally, C to A.
There is much to be said for transitivity as the measure of rationality
in a system of collective choice. In rule- of-law terms, we should disfavor
the instability and unpredictability, and the resulting drain on our pro-
8. See K. ARROW, supra note 1, at 24-31. Although these conditions may be essential to
systems of collective choice, they are not sufficient. There may be other conditions that should be
met. In our society, individual rights are such a condition; individual choices-speaking freely, for
example-generally ought to prevail in the face of a collective preference to the contrary.
9. See A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 36-40 (1979).
10. See K. ARROW, supra note 1, at 120.
11. For an accessible discussion of the conditions of Arrow's theorem, see A. MACKAY, AR-
ROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE 13-48 (1980).
12. K. ARROW, supra note 1, at 13.
Vol. 1986:948]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ductive capacities, that is created by intransitive social choices. The
framers did. "What farmer or manufacturer," they asked, will invest his
capital or labor "when he can have no assurance that his preparatory
labors and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant gov-
ernment?"' 13 Intransitive social choices also implicate and infringe an-
other, more moral, sense of government. When a political system by its
laws sometimes prefer A to C and other times C to A, how can we say
that one choice is better than the other, and how can a particular choice
command our respect?
In any event, taking this condition of rationality (transitivity) along
with the four conditions of fairness, Arrow proved that no voting system
can simultaneously meet them all, that if a voting system meets essential
conditions of fairness, it cannot yield transitive (rational) choices. Thus,
it may be thought that democratic methods are bound to produce unsta-
ble and chaotic social policy.
There is, however, a way of avoiding the impossibility of rational
social policy shown by Arrow's theorem. That way is to relax the theo-
rem's conditions of fairness. As one or more of these conditions is re-
laxed, rationality becomes possible.14 So it is that as a means of avoiding
an impossibility of rational social policy, relaxing Arrow's nondictator-
ship condition is of some appeal, especially in light of existing political
arrangements. Such a dictatorship is today established, in the person of
bureaucrats, by open-ended delegations of legislative power to agencies.
This way out, however, runs head on into Article I. That article
provides that "all legislative power of the United States shall be vested in
a Congress"'15 and thereafter establishes a process for the exercise of that
power. From the standpoint of Article I, the usual, and grave, objection
to transferring legislative power to agencies is that such transfers are in-
consistent with consensual government as established by the electoral
controls prescribed by Article I. The point here, as I have mentioned, is
that of ensuring "that the fundamental policy decisions in our society
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 421-22 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). A modern affirma-
tion of this rule-of-law value is found in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d
Cir. 1984). In this interesting case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at-
tempted to confine the FTC's open-ended power with respect to "unfair methods of competition,"
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982), by acknowledging the need of the private sector to be able to predict
government action as well as the duty of government to respond to this need. The court stated that
"the Commission owes a duty to define the conditions under which conduct claimed to facilitate
price uniformity would be unfair so that businesses will have an inkling as to what they can lawfully
do rather than be left in a state of complete unpredictability." DuPont, 729 F.2d at 139. For further
treatment of these concerns, see generally F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
14. See W. RIKER, supra note 6, at 136 ("The main thrust of Arrow's theorem and all the
associated literature is that of an unresolved tension between logicality, [rationality,] and fairness,").
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I.
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will be made not by an appointed official but by the body immediately
responsible to the people." 16 Because the inconsistency of administrative
lawmaking with consensual government is not an unmined subject, I will
here ignore it. 17 Instead, following leads suggested by Arrow's theorem,
I will concentrate on matters of stability and circumspection in lawmak-
ing and on how these matters show that rational social policy may be
achieved within the framework of Article I.
A. The Decision Costs of Article I
It is no small irony to question Article I on grounds of instability.
To the framers, looking back on the chaos under the Articles of Confed-
eration, stability was essential to a good legislative process. A sense of
this chaos, a sense similar to the the intransitivity identified by Arrow's
theorem, is provided in Gordon Wood's account of laws "altered-
realtered-made better-made worse; and kept in such a fluctuating po-
sition that people in civil commission scarce know what is law. [Laws] so
profuse and complicated that... the very means appointed to preserve
order had become the source of irregularity and confusion."' 18
The reaction to this instability and a resolve to avoid it is set out in
The Federalist No. 62. Here Madison describes, in rule-of-law terms,
how such instability tended to "damp[] every useful undertaking" and
how "no great improvement... can go forward, which requires the aus-
pices of a steady system of national policy."' 19 But worse than that was a
moral impact such as I have already identified: the "diminution of at-
tachment and reverence" toward a "political system" that lacked "a cer-
tain portion of order and stability." 20
Formally, this "portion of order and stability" was to be instilled by
the decision costs and checks of the legislative process created by Article
16. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. I am also ignoring in this article other important purposes of Article I, including those
involving federalism, see, eg., Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954),
and those obtaining to the development of a broad basis of information about proposed laws. See
THE FEDERALIST No. 56, at 379-80 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (small number of representa-
tives will be able to convey the "knowledge" of each state).
18. G. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 405 (1969).
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 421-22 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Madison further
explained that the rule of law is a barrier to "inconstant government":
What prudent merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce, when he
knows not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What
farmer or manufacturer, will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular
cultivation or establishment, when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors
and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government?
20. Id. at 422.
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1.21 How these costs and checks might do this can be explained by look-
ing at the institutions-the House, the Senate, and the presidency-that
are a part of the Article I process, and by looking at them first from
without, and then from within. From an external perspective, we may
consider the House, the Senate, and the presidency as three separate
members of a grand legislative committee established by Article I. As a
matter of constitutional design, these institutions represent differing con-
stituencies (the President a national constituency, the Senate and House
varying degrees of local constituencies). Because they represent different
constituencies with possibly differing preferences, treating them as sepa-
rate voters seems reasonable. For these voters, the rule established by
Article I is that of unanimity; each committee member may veto any
option that it opposes.22
Does Arrow's theorem show that it is impossible for this committee
to make rational social choices? It does not. Without violating the theo-
rem's conditions of fairness, the committee may make consistent and co-
herent choices. How this is so requires a further examination of the
condition of rationality.
The condition of rationality is one of transitivity, and in this regard,
transitivity as defined by Arrow requires that option A be "as good as"
option B. This "as good as" relation, however, itself subsumes two dif-
ferent relations: a voter may either prefer A to B, or he may be indiffer-
ent as between A and B. Thus if a community is indifferent between A
and B, and between B and C, then these choices imply that it is also
indifferent as between A and C. It seems, however, that without any
significant loss of rationality, transitivity can be dropped as to this second
relation of indifference. For example, assume that A, B, and C are jars of
jelly beans, with A having one more spoonful of jelly beans than B and B
one more than C. It may be that a community is indifferent as to adja-
cent jars on the jelly-bean scale, but not indifferent as to jars that are
further (two spoons worth) apart. (A more global, though probably less
21. See id. at 421-22. The importance of Article I's decision costs was also emphasized in the
crucial state ratification debates. James Wilson explained before the Pennsylvania convention that
"the most useful restraint upon the legislature... arises from the division of its power among two
branches, and from the qualified negative of the President upon both." 2 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 446 (J. Elliot
ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES]. Also, the Supreme Court has come to recognize the
stabilizing effect of the bicameralism and checks of Article I: "The bicameral requirement, the Pre-
sentment Clauses, the President's veto, and Congress' power to override a veto were intended to
erect enduring checks on each Branch and to protect the people from the improvident exercise of
power. .. ." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957 (1983).
22. The President does not formally have an absolute veto; when he vetoes a bill, he ups the
voting rule within each house to a two-thirds majority. The effect, however, is usually that of defeat-
ing the bill, and so we say that the President has a veto.
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reliable, illustration of collective indifference may be offered by choices
among social states of disarmament, cold war, and hot war. Here, while
persons might not distinguish between adjacent social states, they should
certainly distinguish between states further apart.)
The phenomenon of intransitive indifferences, therefore, seems to
"reflect the inability of individuals to distinguish among alternatives that
are close together.' 23 We may, therefore, disregard it, and with virtually
undiminished rationality require transitivity only with respect to "strict
preferences," that is, where one option is perceived as better than the
other. An ordering according to strict preferences is known as quasi
transitivity. 24
Importantly, this condition of quasi transitivity, with its virtually
undiminished rationality, still conforms to the conditions of Arrow's the-
orem. 25 That is, with rationality defined as an ordering according to
strict preferences, the fairness conditions of Arrow's theorem can be met.
Moreover, with quasi transitivity, the choices made remain path in-
dependent; they are not susceptible to manipulation by means of agenda
control.26
A quasi-transitive system does, however, have some features that
may not be attractive. It implies an oligarchy; persons within a commu-
nity will be able to block (veto) preferences opposed to their own.27
(Quasi transitivity does not, however, imply a dictator. No person need
be able to impose his own preferences on the rest of society.) Because
quasi transitivity implies an oligarchy, it implies a system that is (1) less
egalitarian (the vote of persons with a veto counts more), and (2) less
decisive (where one or more persons can block the choice of a majority of
the community, the community simply cannot make as many choices).
Therefore, in such a system, attention should be paid to where power lies
(who has a veto) and to the facility with which it is exercised. Mindful of
these concerns, the framers established an oligarchy of institutions-the
"legislative committee" consisting of the House, the Senate, and the
President-that reifies the national legislative processes so as to make
rational social choices possible.
In the legislative committee that these institutions comprise, the
minimum set of preferences sufficient for making a choice (law) consists
23. Blair & Pollak, Rational Collective Choice, Sc. AM., Aug. 1983, at 88, 91.
24. For discussions of the condition of quasi transitivity, see W. RiKER, supra note 6, at 130-36
(1982); A. SEN, supra note 9, at 15, 49; and Blair & Pollak, supra note 23, at 89-93.
25. For proofs and explanations regarding how a quasi-transitive process meets the fairness
conditions of Arrow's theorem, see A. SEN, supra note 9, at 52-55.
26. See id. at 48-49.
27. See id. at 49-50; Blair & Pollak, supra note 23, at 91.
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of the preferences of one member plus at least the indifference of the
other two. (Any opposed preference will result in a veto.) With such a
minimum winning set, the preference of the whole committee is "strict."
(When one prefers and all others are indifferent, a group is not indiffer-
ent.) Consequently, the decisional process of such a committee results in
an ordering of strict preferences, and thus it is quasi-transitive. In this
way, Article I, among both houses of Congress and the President, creates
a decisional process that can yield consistent and coherent choices with-
out sacrificing fairness.
Having examined Article I from something of an external view, I
shall now move to within, to the internal decisional processes of each
house of Congress. From this perspective, it can be seen that by means
of decision costs within each house, the transitivity condition of Arrow's
theorem is relaxed another degree, this time to a condition of "acyclity."
For present purposes it seems sufficient to say that acyclity, while it is a
somewhat weaker condition than quasi transitivity, is still a condition of
stability: it is an absence of cycles in a relation of strict collective prefer-
ence.28 Aeyclity, and its condition of stability, is induced by voting rules
that require supermajorities.2 9 Such a voting rule seems induced by the
bicameralism of Article I.
On its face, Article I requires a simple majority vote in both houses.
But as Professors Tulloch and Buchanan have explained, that is not the
effect of Article I. Given that members of the House and Senate repre-
sent different constituencies and given that these bodies must concur on a
proposed law, a supermajority-in each house-is in effect required for
much of the legislation approved by Congress.30 As such a
supermajority is induced by bicameralism, so is acyclity and a "portion"
of the "order and stability" that the framers prized.
Formally, at two levels-the quasi transitivity established by its sys-
tem of checks and the acyclity produced by its bicameralism-Article I
establishes a decisional process that, as it rules out cyclical majorities,
inclines toward rationality. Thus it is that Arrow's theorem is not an
28. See A. SEN, supra note 9, at 15-16; Blair & Pollak, supra note 23, at 92-93.
29. The way in which supermajorities preclude cycling may be illustrated by the following
example. If there are only two voters, A and B, and two alternative choices, X and Y, then cycling is
impossible even under pure majority rule because it would require A to prefer X over Y and Y over
X. Sane persons do not do that. If we increase the number of voters to five and the number of
alternatives to three, under pure majority rule cycling is inevitable. But if we change the voting rule
to that of a supermajority of four, cycling is impossible, for reasons similar to those pertaining to the
two-voter, two-alternative situation (one of the four voters would have to vote contrary to his prefer-
ence in order to produce a cycle).
30. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 232-48 (1962). See also P.
ARANSON, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STRATEGY AND CHOICE 367-69 (1981).
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impossibility theorem for Article I. Nonetheless, for Article I, the theo-
rem remains supremely important. With precision it shows the studied
way in which Article I makes rationality possible. At the same time, the
theorem provides a basis for identifying a purpose of Article I in addition
to that of rationality. This purpose is the "circumspection in lawmak-
ing" to which I have previously referred and to which I now turn.
B. The Indecisiveness of Article I and a Regard for a Private
Ordering.
The notion of a "democratic paralysis," a failure to act due not to a
desire for inaction but an inability to agree on the proper action, seems
to me to deserve much further empirical, as well as theoretical,
study.31
To return to a central theme, Arrow's theorem shows that, in sys-
tems of collective choice, we cannot have it all. As we gain in one place,
we stand to lose in another. It should be no surprise, then, that public
choice studies building upon Arrow's theorem show that as stability is
induced in systems of collective choice, the "decisiveness" of those
processes is diminished.32 "Decisive" here refers to the rate at which a
system produces decisions. As the decision costs and checks of Article I
induce stability, they decrease that rate. Thus, a lesser degree of decisive-
ness is ordained by Article I-such is the cost of consensus. To the
framers, however, this diminished decisiveness-at least in the context of
domestic lawmaking33 -was a bonus.
At the Pennsylvania ratification convention, James Wilson ex-
plained that the legislative process he had helped create instilled a "cir-
cumspection in forming the laws" so as to avoid one of government's
worst products, an "inaccurate and undigested code of laws."' 34 A re-
lated point was made by Madison in The Federalist No. 62. There, he
explained that "the facility and excess of lawmaking seem to be the dis-
eases to which our governments are most liable."' 35 So, by means of the
decision costs and checks of Article I, the framers sought to curb this
"facility and excess of lawmaking." As they did so, they explained that
the "injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will
be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad
ones."
36
31. K. ARROW, supra note 1, at 120.
32. See, eg., Blair & Pollak, supra note 23, at 95.
33. Whether an indecisive lawmaking process is equally desirable in the context of foreign af-
fairs or in areas such as the budget, where a decision has to be made each year, is another question.
34. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 21, at 447.
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 417 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
36. Id. No. 73, at 496.
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Undoubtedly, many proposed programs would never clear Congress
if that body had to reach agreement with respect to their substance.
Along with "politics" (the hazard to elected officials of hard choices
among competing interests), an inchoate state of knowledge, scientific or
social, may preclude agreement. In these circumstances-an absence of
agreement among lawmakers as to an alleged problem and its solution-
government interference with a privately ordered society will tend to be
ill-advised and premature. 37
Still, Article I does not regard a private ordering of society as invio-
late. It does, however, require that defects in this ordering, and a remedy
for them, be carefully identified before government upsets it. Only then
is the level of agreement required by Article I likely to be met. The legis-
lative process established by Article I is therefore appropriately described
as "calculated over time to minimize the costs of market failure and
political failure."'38
To carry this notion further, consider Arrow's observation that "[iln
any historically given situation there is a social state which has a pre-
ferred status in social choice in that it will be adopted in the absence of a
specified decision to the contrary. '39 If this is so, the "indecisiveness" of
Article I does not signify a failed process or a failure to reach a choice.
Rather, it means presumptively that choice is the status quo. And in the
society that the Constitution serves, the status quo is largely that of free
and uncoerced private arrangements.
37. As stated in the Senate's "Study on Federal Regulation":
Simply because a problem exists and, in theory is remediable, does not mean that regula-
tion or other government intervention is desirable. Controls should only be undertaken
where there is a clearly identified problem that cannot otherwise be solved, and where the
anticipated achievements are significant and not vitiated by projected adverse conse-
quences.
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No.
13, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. xi (1978). See also THE REGULATORY REFORM ACT, S. REP. No. 284,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-17 (1981) [hereinafter THE REFORM ACT]; A. SCHLESINGER, THE CYCLE
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 311 (1986) ("When the country is not sure what ought to be done, the
delay, debate and further consideration enjoined by the separation of powers are not a bad idea.").
38. Michelman, Politics and Values, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 494-95 (1979).
39. K. ARROW, supra note 1, at 119. Arrow further explained this presumption for the status
quo in the following manner:
Suppose that social state x obtains when the environment is S. Now suppose that there is
an innovation, so that the environment expands. In a basically free enterprise economy
there will be an adaptation which is controlled by property laws and the workings of the
system. The resulting social state, say xi, which in general differs from x, will automati-
cally prevail unless there is a specific legislative decision to alter it.
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II. AGENCY RATIONALITY AND CIRCUMSPECTION
As I said at the outset, the delegation of legislative power to agencies
is usually seen as a trade-off of democratic values for the greater rational-
ity and decisiveness of agencies. But because this view assumes that ra-
tionality is in fact served by administrative lawmaking and because it
fails to question the desirability of greater decisiveness, I think it is too
narrow. Consequently, I will now extend the inquiry to consider
whether open-ended delegations of legislative power to agencies comport
with Article I's purposes of rationality and circumspection in lawmaking.
A. Positive Government and Indecisiveness.
Rather than being seen as inducing a healthy tendency toward cir-
cumspection in government, the decision costs and checks of Article I
have come to be seen as creating an unfortunate tendency toward dead-
lock in government. Undoubtedly, this disaffection has been an aspect of
a faith in positive government that grew with the New Deal, a faith seen
in Felix Frankfurter's endorsement of the following proposition:
The way to realize a purpose is, not to leave it to chance, but to keep it
loyally in mind and adopt means proper to the importance and the
difficulty of the task. No voluntary association of individuals, re-
sourceful and disinterested though they be, is competent to assume the
responsibility. The problem belongs to the American national democ-
racy, and its solution must be attempted chiefly by means of official
national action.40
If an assertion of government power-"official national action"-is
presumptively good, then encumbrances on this power are bad, and the
worst of these encumbrances are the decision costs and checks of Article
I. Institutional arrangements that transmit government power away
from these costs are therefore favored. Of these arrangements, the most
prominent is that of transferring, or delegating, legislative power to ad-
ministrative agencies. These delegations as they deliver power en gross,
unharnessed and unchecked, are, as Professor Jaffee has said, truly the
"dynamo of the modern social services state."'4 1
Faith in positive government has operated at several levels to create
and accommodate this dynamo. It has operated in Congress, contribut-
ing to what is known as a "regulatory lottery." 42 Legislators, believing
that government ought to take action but unable in Congress to achieve
40. F. FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS 308 (1939) (quoting H. CROLY, THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LIFE (1909)).
41. Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative Power: I, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 592 (1947).




agreement as to the rudiments of that action, make action in some form
possible by an open-ended delegation of legislative power to an agency.
Their hope is that the action the agency takes will, by the legislators' own
lights, turn out to be good.43
This lottery does not necessarily or even usually render the problem
more tractable or move it closer to a good solution. In our political sys-
tem, agencies, when left to make basic policy decisions, generally do not
seem to arrive at these decisions in the rational, scientific way that schol-
ars had predicted. 44 Also, the agency does not necessarily have informa-
tion or access to information about these choices that is denied to
Congress. The one thing that passing a problem to an agency can confi-
dently be counted on to do, however, is to bring that problem closer to a
solution. The agency, with a more narrow sense of mission and fewer
decision costs, will usually succumb to the enduring compulsion of agen-
cies: it will proceed to regulate, even with a significant risk of being
wrong.45
A classic description of the regulatory lottery is provided by the fol-
lowing exuberant account of the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board
(the CAB):
There will of course be occasions when Congress cannot make wise
decisions because experience with the substantive areas under consid-
eration is too limited and the policy questions that must be answered
are still too indistinct to permit responsible lawmaking. This was
surely the case, for example, when Congress passed the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act of 1938. In such cases, broad delegations of legislative power
to administrative agencies are essential if effective government action is
to be taken at all. 46
43. In this regard, as lawyers know, legislative histories show varying expectations in that lot-
tery, and therefore commonly support mutually inconsistent courses of action.
44. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
45. See SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST SESs., REPORT ON CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE 20 (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter REPORT] ("[T]he classical regulatory response to de-
fects in regulation is to create more regulation."). A similar observation about agency bias toward
"doing something" has been made with reference to the Consumer Products Safety Commission:
The CPSC is not in charge of keeping down the cost of living, or saving people an ounce of
inconvenience, or maximizing freedom of choice (even though officials do take such factors
into consideration). The CPSC is in the business of reducing injury from consumer prod-
ucts, and it is hardly surprising that its bias is towards taking measures which promote that
goal, even when they have attendant costs.
Kelman, Regulation by the Numbers-A Report on the Consumer Products Safety Commission, 36
PUB. INTEREST 83, 90-91 (1974). As explained by Professor Jaffe, the agencies are not so much
industry-oriented or consumer-oriented as they are regulation-oriented: they are in the regulation
business, and regulate they will. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevalu-
ation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1113-19 (1954).
46. See J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 93-94 (1978).
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The issues too "indistinct" for congressional resolution were largely eco-
nomic issues such as whether only a few major airlines should be pro-
moted, whether local air service to smaller communities should be
promoted, and so on. Over the years, the CAB was criticized for its own
failure to develop firm policies with respect to these matters. But the
CAB did of course act consistently in one direction: it persistently chose
government control and regulation as the general solution to airline
problems. Today, of course, this solution has been determined to be a
bad one, and by a process of "deregulation" it has been undone.47
The example of the CAB illustrates the problem-an unacceptable
risk that government regulation will be inferior to uncoerced private ar-
rangements-that results from bypassing the constraints of Article I.
Studies forming the backbone of the deregulation movement have pro-
vided a more systematic examination of whether broad scale transfers of
legislative power to agencies create such a problem. Generally, the fields
for deregulation identified by these studies tend to be occupied by agen-
cies to which Congress has open-endedly transferred its legislative
power.48
B. Agency Rationality.
The capacity of agencies, operating according to principles of tech-
nocratic governance, to produce consistent and coherent social policy is
the long-standing raison d'&re of the administrative state. For a couple
of reasons, however, agencies, at least in our political system, can be ex-
pected to fall short of this rationality standard.
What is probably the lesser reason pertains to the common "com-
mission" structure of administrative agencies. This structure is that of
an agency headed by'a multimember body, with agency action ordained
by a majority vote of that body. This sort of decisional process, commit-
tee voting by means of majority rule, is the very process for which Ar-
row's theorem shows the impossibility of rational social choice. It
cannot, therefore, be presumed to be capable of developing consistent
and coherent social policy.49
47. See Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1744 (1978) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
48. See, eg., REPORT, supra note 45, at 19; Peck, Competitive Policy for Transportation, in THE
CRISIS OF THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 77-78, 89 (P. MacAvoy ed. 1970); Fowler & Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 256 (1981).
49. In an analysis premised on Arrow's theorem, Professor Easterbrook has suggested that a
similar institutional defect plagues another multimember body governed by pure majority rule-the




In the context of a commission voting according to majority rule,
consistent voting results can, however, be induced by means of a condi-
tion known as "single peakedness." Single peakedness refers to a homo-
geneity of basic values within a voting group. With it, rational social
choice is possible-even in the case of an institution operating according
to pure majority rule.50 Congress may induce homogeneity in agencies
and the commissions that head them, but to do so Congress must forgo
open-ended delegations of legislative power to those agencies. Congress
itself must make basic policy choices and provide the agencies with stan-
dards and marching orders respecting those choices. These directions
from Congress, by narrowing the range of values that the agency may
choose from, should induce the homogeneity essential to rational
regulation.
Another means of avoiding inconsistent social choices by commis-
sions is to eliminate commissions, and to place each agency under the
control of a single person. But that action would probably not work
either, for reasons pertaining to the nature of our political system. In our
system, bureaucratic planners do not occupy the removed and disinter-
ested positions that scholars have sometimes presumed. Without objec-
tive and scientific measures of the "public interest" to bolster them,51
without an anchor in the Constitution, and without ratification of their
choices by means of the ballot box, agency officials can and will be set
upon by individual congressmen or congressional committees, by the
White House, by the courts, and by interest groups. Subject to these
pressures, agencies twist and turn, and indeterminate and fluctuating pol-
icy is often the result.52
The rough hypothesis that I am trying to establish is that open-
ended delegations of legislative power to agencies contribute to an insti-
50. See D. BLACK, supra note 7, at 14.
51. The customary justification for committing social policy to experts involves a concept of
lawmaking according to clean scientific truths, divined by experts, as would lift it out of the infirm
muck of politics. This idea of scientifically determined social policy is, however, flawed. Insofar as
basic choices of social policy are concerned, there is usually no objectively determinable scientific
truth sufficient to guide and bolster the expert planner. Science might, for example, be able to relate
the health of workers to certain types and quantities of carcinogens. But the larger question-which
levels of carcinogens best serves the interest of these workers as well as the interest of the rest of
society-involves trade-offs with aggregated personal preferences about safety, risk acceptance,
wages, productivity, and inflation. In weighing these primary choices among conflicting personal
preferences, "technical experts have no special claim to wisdom," S. BREYER & R. STEWART, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 128 (1985), and they are not "institutionally capa-
ble of making the basic value choices." THE REFORM ACT, supra note 37, at 59.
52. A thorough study and explanation of the failure, indeed the inability, of agencies to them-
selves develop consistent social policy is provided by T. LoWi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOL-
OGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1969). See also THE REFORM ACT, supra
note 37, at 59.
[Vol. 1986:948
COLLECTIVE CHOICE
tutional neurosis that makes rational regulation unlikely, if not impossi-
ble. If, however, Congress itself resolves major policy issues and sets
basic standards, then the agency official has a politically secure frame-
work in which expertise can be applied so as to make rational social
choices possible and perhaps even likely.
This hypothesis is supported by agency practice. Those agencies of
higher regard in terms of their coherency, stability, and professionalism
are generally those agencies that were created after Congress had with
care identified a defect in private orderings and then worked out the rudi-
ments of repair. These agencies should include the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, the Securities Exchange Commission, and the Social
Security Administration.53 The regard for these agencies should be con-
trasted to a general disappointment with the rationalism of agencies of
more open-ended delegations, where there was never agreement in Con-
gress either as to the defects in a private ordering or a cure. These agen-
cies should include the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.54
53. For studies attesting to the fact that in the case of these agencies Congress carried out its
primary task of identifying social problems and provided the agencies with the rudiments of solu-
tions to those problems, see M. DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 21, 46 (1979);
and Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public Offering of Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
119, 156 (1959). With respect to the EPA, the statutory mandate under which it operates has been
described by the Supreme Court as a "lengthy, detailed, technical, complex, and comprehensive
response to a major social issue." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837, 848 (1984). In implementing this program, the EPA has been credited with doing a gener-
ally professional job. See, e.g., Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in THE POLITICS OF REG-
ULATION 267, 300-01 (J. Wilson ed. 1980). One criticism of the EPA's statutory mandate is that the
standards were perhaps too stringent. Without compromising the general requirement of standards,
those particular standards might have been somewhat less stringent so as to allow the EPA more
flexibility in a quickly developing technology. See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/
DIRTY AIR 56-57 (1981).
54. Bad reviews of the work of these agencies are not in short supply. A typical review of
OSHA is that "[b]oth politically and practically [OSHA] has been a failure. It has generated fierce
antagonism in the business community and is viewed as the quintessential government intrusion.
And it has had virtually no noticeable impact on work related injuries and illnesses." Nichols &
Zeckhauser, Government Comes to the Workplace." An Assessment of OSHA, 49 PUB. INTEREST 39,
42 (1977). OSHA operates under an open-ended "safe and healthful working conditions" form of
delegation. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1982). For a
review of the work of the FTC, see generally THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970:
ECONOMIC REGULATION AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR (K. Clarkson & T. Muris eds. 1981);
Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1969). For a comprehensive study
of the failure of agencies with broad delegations of authority to develop policy and theory, see T.
Lowi, supra note 52.
Support for the general thesis that agencies perform better when Congress itself carefully identi-
fies a problem and provides at least the rudiments of a remedy is provided by the following compari-
son of the National Labor Relations Board with New Deal agencies that failed:
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III. THE DELEGATION DOCTRINE
To this point, I have examined a certain first impression about Ar-
row's theorem and democratic politics: that rational social policy is im-
possible within the zone of democratic politics created by Article I of the
Constitution, and that therefore we should escape that zone to areas
where such rationality is possible. The modem administrative agency is
thought to be such a place, because it is thought to operate according to a
condition of dictatorship that makes rationality possible.
This whole impression, however, seems wrong. It seems wrong in-
asmuch as Article I mitigates the idea of straight-out democratic poli-
tics-the simple idea of majoritarian rule-for which Arrow's theorem
shows an impossibility of rational social choice. Article I mitigates this
idea of majoritarian rule by means of an elaborate system of decision
costs and checks which, in technical terms of quasi transitivity and acyc-
lity, make rationality possible-and indeed enhance it. What might be
considered a cost of this mitigation is a loss of decisiveness in the system.
The framers, however, turned this "cost" around. They used it to dimin-
ish the risk of government regulation that turns out to be inferior to pri-
vate and uncoerced social and economic choices.
The impression about Arrow's theorem and Article I also seems
wrong as it pertains to achieving rationality through bureaucratic
processes. Considering the common commission form of administrative
agencies and, more importantly, considering the generally politically in-
secure framework of these agencies, the rationality that has been ex-
pected of them, at least where they are the unfortunate recipients of
open-ended delegations of legislative power, has not been forthcoming.
So what are we to make of these things? It is that as a matter of
constitutional principle (a principle drawn from Article I, its purposes of
rationality and circumspection, and its more commonly expressed pur-
pose of consensual government), "important choices of social policy"55
should be made in Congress and not in the agencies. This principle
should first of all be followed in Congress, and today that seems to be the
case. There is evidence that Congress has abandoned its past practice of
weak-kneed "go forth and do good" types of delegations, and is instead
[Tihe Wagner Act was a skillfully drafted statute adopted after two years of revision and
consideration .... [T]he NRA codes and AAA marketing agreements were adopted
quickly without adequate consideration and review. In fact, both the NRA and AAA were
dubious products of political expediency. If Congress had acted with greater care and less
unthinking haste, each agency might have proven less vulnerable constitutionally.
Teaford, A Plague of Young Lawyers: Irons on The New Deal Lawyers, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. Rus.
J. 966, 969.




providing primary standards to guide and contain agency power.5 6
The question that remains, however, and the question that I wish to
address in this final Part, is whether this principle-that important
choices of social policy should be made in Congress-should and can
amount to a legal right. Should and can a private party expect the courts
to require that Congress make these choices?57 In the courts, such a
right, as it is grounded in the purposes of Article I, seems to have re-
ceived the Supreme Court's endorsement in its famous "legislative veto"
case.5 8 In that case the Court acknowledged that Article I is a "single,
finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" 59 and invited a
strict attention-on the part of the courts-to maintaining that process.
The legal right pertinent to ensuring that Congress makes important
social policy choices is encapsulated in the well-known "delegation doc-
trine." By this doctrine, the courts, on the petition of private parties, are
supposed to ensure that primary legislative power remains in Congress.
In this form, the doctrine acknowledges that a secondary degree of law-
making power may be usefully and lawfully delegated to agencies. The
reasons why such delegations are appropriate may be quickly summa-
rized. To start with, and as explained by Thomas Jefferson, the resources
of Congress may be usefully conserved by avoiding the diversion of that
body "from great to small objects."' 60 At the same time, agencies with
their lower decision costs are often better at working through "a laby-
rinth of detail."' 61 The lower decision costs of agencies also make possi-
ble an adaptability that forms another reason for the delegation. By first
establishing primary standards, and then delegating a secondary lawmak-
ing authority to agencies, Congress can create a useful flexibility in the
face of changing circumstances-a flexibility that is perhaps most useful
where technology is rapidly developing, as in the area of environmental
56. For discussions of the revived congressional interest in tighter delegations, see E. BARDACH
& R. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK 46-49 (1982); and Marcus, supra note 53, at 267-74. See also
THE REFORM Acr, supra note 37, at 172-73; McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated
Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119, 1130 n.44, 1132 n.47 (1977). For recent examples of the practice
of tighter delegation, see the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 31, 45 & 49 U.S.C.); the
Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 45 & 49 U.S.C.); and the Long-Cannon Amendment, 49 U.S.C.A. § 10707a(e)(2)(A)
(West Supp. 1986).
57. Since legislators may for self-serving reasons seek to give up their legislative power, see
Aranson, Gellhom & Robinson, supra note 42, at 56-62, the check ofjudicial review seems especially
necessary in order to keep that power in Congress and out of the agencies.
58. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
59. Id. at 951.
60. 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 424-25 (P. Ford ed. 1894).




So, yes, while "important choices of social policy" ought to be made
in Congress, at the same time some delegation of secondary legislative
power seems useful if not essential. The problem that bothers many
scholars, however, is this: How are the courts to distinguish between a
nondelegable primary power and a delegable secondary power? In one
important context, this problem is avoided because the delegation doc-
trine, properly construed, simply does not require the courts to make this
kind of distinction. In this context, the courts stand as a barrier to the
common bureaucratic tendency to aggrandize power. An excellent ex-
ample is provided by a case decided by the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit, in which the Interstate Commerce
Commission, by means of its own selective reading of its statutory char-
ter, ignored the charter's several standards that defined and confined its
power.63 Instead, the ICC tried to expand its power by fastening on such
expansive and open-ended phrases as might be found in its charter. On
the basis of this parsing of its statutory authority, the Commission
claimed that it had been broadly delegated the power to implement a
"national transportation policy." 64
The Fifth Circuit, however, held that the Commission's power was
not to be measured by vague and general phrases found in its charter.
"Such a reading," the court said, "would make superfluous much of the
rest of the Revised Interstate Commerce Act, with its detailed guidelines
and delegations of authority. ' 65 Moreover, the court warned that "con-
struing the National Transportation Policy, which paraphrased says little
more than 'go forth and do good,' as a congressional grant of rulemaking
authority might well amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority. '66
Still the question remains. What if Congress oversteps, and lets go
of its primary legislative power? Is that an event that the courts can
discern and check? Consistently, through all the ups and downs of the
delegation doctrine, the courts have maintained that they can.67 They
62. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863-64
(1984) ("[T]he agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and
the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.").
63. Central Forwarding, Inc. v. ICC, 698 F.2d 1266, 1279-83 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Global
Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 714 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1983).
64. Central Forwarding, 698 F.2d at 1283.
65. Id. at 1284.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974);
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Wayman v. Southard, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-50 (1825). The link between a requirement of standards and the delegation
doctrine is longstanding. James Madison explained: "If nothing more were required, in exercising a
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say that they can do so by means of a requirement of standards, and
given a reasonably clear idea of what a standard is, I think that they are
right.
In this context, the term "standard" should be thought of in its
traditional sense of a statement of a limited range of "exclusively relevant
values."'68 Under this definition, agencies may not be left free to choose
from an unlimited range of values, as is the case with delegations of the
"public interest" variety.69 And under this definition, the courts have
indeed been able to discern whether an agency has been left free to
choose among values "in the manner of" a legislative body.
In a major delegation doctrine case, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 70
the Supreme Court was concerned with a delegation of authority to pro-
hibit the transportation of "hot oil" among the states.71 Addressing the
validity of that delegation, Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court,
defined the Court's role as that of "look[ing] to the statute" to see
whether Congress had "set up a standard." 72 And here Congress, as the
Court was able to discern, had not done so. Congress had, to be sure,
provided an extensive statement of purposes, such as promoting coopera-
tive action among industrial groups, eliminating unfair competitive prac-
tices, inducing labor-management unity, promoting the fullest utilization
of existing productive capacity, reducing unemployment, and so forth.73
But in these "diverse objectives broadly stated,"'74 Congress's failure to
establish national policy was writ large. These were not standards; in-
stead, they were simply a recital, without resolution, of the values and
interests that had confronted Congress.
A more recent example of the viability of a court-enforced require-
ment of standards is provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Na-
tional Cable Television Association v. United States.75 In 1952, Congress
had by statute authorized the agencies (particularly the Federal Commu-
nications Commission) to become "self-sustaining" by charging the pri-
legislative trust, than a general conveyance of authority-without laying down any precise rules by
which the authority conveyed should be carried into effect-it would follow that the whole power of
legislation might be transferred by the legislature from itself .. " 4 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note
21, at 560.
68. Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart-Dworkin Dispute, 75 MICH.
L. REv. 473, 482 (1977).
69. As one court has said, "[t]he phrase 'public interest' is 'a concept without ascertainable
criterion.'" Bell Tel. Co. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 116, 21 A.2d 912, 915 (1941).
70. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
71. Id. at 414-15.
72. Id. at 415.
73. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195, 200 (1933).
74. Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 420.
75. 415 U.S. 336 (1974).
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vate sector for the value of regulatory benefits bestowed. 76 Under this
statute, the amount of the charge was to be calculated according to the
"direct and indirect cost to the Government, value to the recipient, pub-
lic policy or interest served, and other pertinent facts."'77 Pursuant to
this provision, the Federal Communications Commission imposed a
charge of $1,145,000 on cable television systems.78
The plaintiff, a cable television trade association, argued that this
charge was in fact a tax and thus an unconstitutional assumption of a
legislative power reserved for Congress. That argument prevailed. 79 In
finding for the plaintiff, the Court affirmed that as a matter of constitu-
tional principle, "Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to
others the essential legislative functions with which it is ... vested."' 80 It
applied this principle by eliminating those portions of the Act that left
the agency free to pick among competing values "in the manner of" a
legislative body. In particular, the Court objected to the Act's "public
policy or interest served" measure of charges, because that measure "if
read literally, carries an agency far from its customary orbit and puts it
in search of revenue in the manner of an Appropriations Committee of
the House." '81 By eliminating these open-ended parts of the Act, the
Court confined agency power to the determinate "value to the recipient"
portion.82
These cases show that the long-standing requirement of standards
provides a measure sufficiently objective to enable the courts to ensure
that primary choices of social policy are made in Congress rather than in
the agencies. 83 Once the threshold of standards is reached, however, the
work of the courts is at an end. Thereafter, the degree of authority that
Congress wishes to delegate is a decision that properly lies with
Congress. 84
76. Independent Offices Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 138, 65 Stat. 268 (1952) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12, 31, 36, 42, 46, 49 & 50 U.S.C.).
77. Id. tit. 5, 65 Stat. at 290 (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 9701 (1982)).
78. National Cable Television, 415 U.S. at 340.
79. Id. at 340-44.
80. Id. at 342 (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529
(1935)).
81. Id. at 341.
82. Id.
83. The requirement of standards relates to keeping "important matters of social policy" in
Congress; however, where such matters are not involved and the agency is not expected to develop
broad social policy, it is not as essential to maintain primary legislative authority in Congress. In
such cases, the requirement of standards is less stringently applied. See, e.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904) (approving open-ended agency authority to grade quality of imported tea).
84. As the Supreme Court has stated:
(E]ach enactment must be considered to determine whether it states the purpose which the




As seen in the strong clear light of Arrow's theorem, a bottom line
of Article I is that, as someone has said, "democracy is a system for
people who are not sure that they are right." That modesty ought not to
be lost by replacing the constraints of Article I with the permissiveness of
open-ended transfers of legislative power to agencies. In principle, the
Supreme Court seems to agree, for in Bowsher v. Synar it explained that
"the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if
it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government."85
Finally, I should say that the rationality and circumspection that I
have identified as purposes of Article I are by no means fully realized in
Congress: politics are not so perfectly harnessed. Nonetheless, in Con-
gress these purposes should amount to continuities, and in that sense the
delegation doctrine should avoid a retardation of them.
with sufficient exactness to enable those affected to understand these limits. Within these
tests Congress needs to specify only so far as is reasonably practicable.
United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op., 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1939). See also Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (nondelegation
doctrine guarantees that "to the extent Congress finds it necessary to delegate authority, it provides
the recipient of that authority with an 'intelligible principle' to guide the exercise of the delegated
discretion").
85. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3193-94 (1986) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
944 (1983)).
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